EWI Security of Supply Update

Simulation of current gas market developments in Europe with a special focus on Germany

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Energiewirtschaftliches Institut der Universität zu Köln
1. Introduction
Low gas storage levels because of low oil prices

Oil market developments foster withdrawals from gas storages

- Significant part of long-term gas import contracts based on oil-indexation
- Price adjustments after 3 or 6 months, thus low contract-prices expected
- Traders have incentives to sell gas now

Gas storage in Germany and in Europe on a lower level than usually at the end of February.

Sources: World Bank (2015), own calculations based on GIE (2015)
Risks for European gas supply

Risk factor 1: Ongoing gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine

"Therefore, gas delivery to Ukraine in the ordered amount of 114mcm will lead to a complete cessation of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine in just two days, which creates serious risks for gas transit to Europe. “ (Alexei Miller, Gazprom)

Risk factor 2: Low temperatures in March
• In March 2013, average daily gas demand in Germany stood at 410 mcm/d
Simulation of disruption scenarios

Methodology

- Use of the European gas market simulation model TIGER
- Simulation of two disruption scenarios (A and B) for 2015
  - current low storage levels
  - 1 month disruption starting on March 1st.
  - Assuming a high gas demand as in March 2013

A) Disruption of Russian gas flows to Ukraine (1 month)
B) Full disruption of Russian gas flows (1 month)

Weather pattern as in March 2013

Is gas supply in Europe secure in March 2015?
2. Results
No disruption of Russian gas flows

German gas supply structure 2015

- Despite low storage levels, a March cold spell would not cause any supply problems in DE
- German gas storages would contribute up to 200 mcm/d
A) Disruption of Russia-Ukraine gas flows

German gas supply structure 2015

- In a Russia-Ukraine disruption plus March cold spell, German gas demand could be satisfied
- German gas storages and increased Nord Stream imports secure supplies
- Higher gas flows to Austria (via Oberkappel & Burghausen) and Czech Republic (via OPAL)
A) Disruption of Russia-Ukraine gas flows

Gas balance Germany on March peak day

- In a Russia-Ukraine gas flow disruption plus March cold spell, German gas storages contribute ca. 250 mcm on the peak demand day.
A) Disruption of Russia-Ukraine gas flows

- In a disruption of Russian-Ukraine gas flows, German gas storages would reach critical filling levels.
- Average storage levels would be below 20% for 54 days.
- Depending on individual storage properties, low filling levels for a too long time period could cause problems with the geological stability of the storage.
A) Disruption of Russia-Ukraine gas flows

Maximum daily supply shortfall (normal weather)

- Given a normal weather pattern in March and a disruption of Russia-Ukraine gas flows, gas supplies could be secured in Europe by increased storage withdrawals and reverse flows.
A) Disruption of Russia-Ukraine gas flows

Maximum daily supply shortfall (March cold spell)

- Under a March cold spell, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Bosnia/Herzegovina would suffer from serious supply shortfalls with some days in March when shortfalls would exceed 50% (BG), 100% (MK) and 28% (BA).
- Other countries such as Hungary, Slovakia or the Ukraine benefit from their (compared to the demand) large storage capacities and reverse flows.
B) Full disruption of Russian gas flows

In a full disruption of Russian exports (normal weather), German gas storages would fill the gap.

Assuming additionally a March cold spell, German gas demand could not be fully supplied.

Increased imports from NL and AT plus storage withdrawals would help to limit shortfalls.
### B) Full disruption of Russian gas flows

**Gas balance Germany on March peak day**

In either a 1-month full disruption of Russian gas or in a March cold spell, German gas demand would be secure, mainly because of increased storage withdrawals (ca. 200 mcm/d).

In a full disruption of Russian gas plus a March cold spell, the German gas market could be supplied with a maximum of 436 mcm/d, with German storages contributing roughly 270 mcm/d.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Normal situation</th>
<th>Full RU disruption</th>
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<td>Normal weather</td>
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<td>Cold spell</td>
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- 🌅 CH
- 🌅 Production

- Storage
- Shortfall
- Max. supply
- Demand
B) Full disruption of Russian gas flows
Storage levels in Germany reach critical levels

- In a full disruption of Russian gas flows German gas storages would reach critical filling levels
- For 63 days, average storage levels would be below 20%, for 3 days even below 10%
- Depending on individual storage properties, low filling levels for a too long time period could cause problems with the geological stability of the storage
**B) Full disruption of Russian gas flows**

Maximal daily supply shortfalls by country (normal weather)

- In a full disruption of Russian gas with normal weather, only Poland, Finland, and Bosnia and Herzegovina would be affected.
B) Full disruption of Russian gas flows

Maximal daily supply shortfalls by country (March cold spell, current LNG volumes)

- In a full disruption of Russian gas plus a cold March, supply shortfall in many European countries could occur (assuming current levels of LNG imports to Europe).
- Countrywise supply problems could increase/decrease with different cold spell gas demand assumptions
B) Full disruption of Russian gas flows

Maximal daily supply shortfalls by country (March cold spell, additional LNG imports available after 10 days)

- Assuming additional LNG imports arriving in Europe 10 days after the disruption starts, supply problems would occur in Eastern Europe, whereas Western and Central Europe were fully supplied.
- LNG availability (in particular the time lag until additional ships reach Europe) is crucial to the supply situation.
Which factors could alter the picture?

**Uncertainty of events**
- Colder/warmer weather (hence, gas demand) in different countries/regions, especially during March cold spell
- Additional disruptions of gas infrastructure

**Uncertainty of behavior**
- Longer/shorter duration of a disruption of Russian gas
- Will European countries really perfectly cooperate (as assumed)?

**Limited data**
- Higher/lower production flexibility for certain gas fields (e.g. Groningen field)
- More/less flexibility from LNG imports (position of LNG vessels not modelled)
- Local infrastructure specifics in certain countries (could cause regional supply problems)
- Fuel switching to other primary energy
- Minimum filling level of certain storages because of geological stability
3. Conclusion
Conclusion

Germany
- A 1 month **Ukraine transit disruption** would not cause any supply problems for Germany even during a very cold March.
- Supply would also be secure during a 1 month **full disruption** of Russian gas deliveries with normal weather conditions because of gas storages.
- In a very cold March as in 2013, a 1 month **full disruption** of Russian gas deliveries would cause minor supply shortages (ca. 3% of daily demand) with gas storages providing most of the needed gas.
- However, gas storages would reach critical levels, signaling that securing supply would stress the gas system to the utmost.

Europe
- In a 1 month **Ukraine transit disruption** with a cold March Bulgaria, Bosnia/Herzegovina and Macedonia would suffer from supply shortages.
- Many countries including Ukraine itself would secure supply by increased storage withdrawals and reverse flows.
- During a 1 month **full disruption** of Russian gas deliveries with a March cold spell, gas supply in many Eastern European countries would fall short, Ukraine included.
- France's security of supply heavily relies on additional LNG imports.
Thank You for Your Attention
Any Questions or Remarks?

Dr. Harald Hecking
Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne (EWI)
Alte Wagenfabrik
Vogelsanger Str. 321a
50827 Cologne, Germany
Tel. +49 – 221 27729 221
Email: harald.hecking@ewi.uni-koeln.de
Appendix – Assumptions
## Assumptions

Demand during the cold spell in March

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Normal weather</th>
<th>Cold spell</th>
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<td>Average demand (mcm/d)</td>
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Assumptions

LNG availability

- LNG availability: 54,5 bcm/y and 166 mcm/d
- Two sensitivities:
  1) No additional LNG imports available during March
  2) Additional LNG imports available 10 days after the disruption starts